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 I have always thought of Sidman's classic text, known affectionately as
 Tactics (1960), as primarily a philosophy of science text. I was surprised to learn
 that Sidman himself did not see it as particularly relevant to the philosophy of
 science (Sidman 2010, this volume). It appears that since 1960 Sidman has been
 busy doing his ground-breaking basic and applied work unaware of his status as a
 philosopher of science, at least to some of us. This is surprising, because on
 reading the Remarks series, it is apparent that Sidman does not reside at the centre
 of our science, but at the very edge. No good behavioral engineer can push the
 boundaries of their own discipline, as Sidman has done, without a keen
 appreciation of the philosophy of their science.
 Contained within Sidman's Remarks are superb illustrations of the radical
 behaviorist's approach to behavior. These illustrations draw upon a nuanced
 appreciation of our basic units of analysis that one rarely encounters in daily
 practice. However, there is a consistent and important theme running through these
 papers regarding the inferential nature of behavioral units. On several occasions,
 explicitly and implicitly, Sidman raises the crucial matter of stimulus control as an
 inference (e.g., Sidman, 1977). Indeed, there is nothing in the behavioristic
 formulation that requires behavioral units to be anything more tangible than an
 inference. He argues that unless we accept that stimulus control is an inference (a
 discrimination of the effectiveness of our own experimental manipulations across
 time) we may be seduced into seeking mediational accounts to explain stimulus-
 stimulus relations (e.g., such as stimulus equivalence). Seeking a mediational
 account is surplus to requirements, and Sidman clearly sees that seeking one will
 hamstring the development of stimulus control-based accounts of cognition, in
 which he shows a keen interest. Sidman summarized the idea as follows:
 . . .we can never see a controlling relation, with surety. We can only infer its
 existence actuarially and post hoc after a number of instances have permitted us
 to rule out other controlling relations, (emphasis in original; 1977, p. 280)
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 Sidman speaks loosely of stimuli and responses in other passages, suggesting
 that perhaps these particular behavioral units are in fact not inferences. For
 example, in one passage he says:
 We can, of course, observe and measure a single instance of any stimulus, but
 we can never know except by inference whether we are actually observing a
 particular controlling relational between two stimuli or between a stimulus and
 response. Unlike individual stimuli and responses, controlling relations are not
 directly observable. (1979, p. 123)
 However, this would appear to be language of convenience. Stimuli and
 responses are, of course, themselves classes that must be discriminated across
 multiple observations. In other words, they too must be inferred (i.e., they are
 functional units). While instances of a stimulus may be observable, the stimulus
 itself is not (i.e., it is a class). In another passage from the Remarks series Sidman
 clarifies the foregoing issue while discussing the foundational co-definition of
 stimuli and responses:
 If neither stimulus nor response can be defined except circularly, each by
 reference to the other, then neither of them alone can constitute our fundamental
 unit. The unit must include both. Behavior is not to be equated only with
 responses, but must include the relation of responses to controlling stimuli.
 (1978, p. 266; see also Skinner, 1938, p. 9)
 This final statement is profoundly important and leads to the conclusion that
 behavior may not be the observable activity of organisms (what many of us may
 loosely think of as "responses"). This radical implication that I am inferring from
 Sidman's remarks are perhaps best summarized by his observations of the location
 of behavior:
 Perhaps the learner 's performance is not the critical datum at all. For example,
 if the occurrence or nonoccurrence of errors merely specifies a relation between
 the behavior of the learner and the teacher, perhaps theories of learning should
 stress the behavior of teachers rather than of learners, (emphasis in original;
 1977, pp. 112-113)
 The point is made again in his 1979 paper:
 Learning curves might just as well be called teaching curves, for they allow us
 to infer at least as much about the behavior of experimenters as about the
 behavior of subjects. (1979, p. 125)
 These comments leave us in no doubt that behavioral units are not to be
 bound by the observable activity of our subjects. They are spatio-temporally
 extended units based on inference made across time (see also Hull, 1984; Roche &
 Barnes, 1997).
 While a distinction between behavior and organismic activity may seem
 unintuitive, it is in fact crucial if we are to competently address the matter of
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 complex forms of derived relational responding, which patently involves
 overarching classes of responses, defined non-topographically, but rather
 relationally. Based on our community's former reluctance to entertain the concept
 of stimulus-stimulus relations in the absence of mediation, and some current
 resistance to the possibility of more complex stimulus-stimulus relations such as
 complex derived relational responding (i.e., relational frames), it would appear that
 many of us do not, in practice, appreciate the spatio-temporally extended nature of
 operant units and the inferential nature of stimulus control. Sidman's insights bring
 us face to face with the profoundly simple - but infinitely expansive and
 abstracted - nature of our behavioral units. Behavioral units incorporate instances,
 but they are not them.
 Sidman expressly raised these issues in the context of arguing for the need for
 stimulus control analyses of cognitive phenomena - but I wonder if he appreciates
 that once the break has been made between functional behavioral units and the
 discrete topographies of organismic movement that participate in those units, there
 is no end to the forms of complex behavior that can be brought into our remit as
 experimental analysts of behavior. The remit is much broader than stimulus-
 stimulus relations defined in terms of functional equivalence or mutual
 substitutability (i.e., stimulus equivalence). Once the operant and its constituent
 parts have been freed from the constraints of observable, discrete activities, the
 operant expands spatio-temporally to infinity. That is, if mediation is not required
 to validate stimulus control measures, and if response classes are not defined by
 topography, then any pattern of response forms that is functionally related to any
 pattern of stimulus forms constitutes a stimulus-response relation. Similarly, any
 pattern of stimulus-stimulus relation, whether it is takes the form of functional
 equivalence or not, can constitute a legitimate basis for stimulus control. For
 instance, the observation that a subject can always choose from a range of
 comparison stimuli, the one that is "greater than" a sample stimulus, requires no
 mediational account, and the novelty of the stimulus forms employed in such a test
 does not pose a threat to the integrity of an account based on generalized relational
 responding in accordance with a "comparative relation" (i.e., the language of
 Relational Frame Theory; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001).
 Sidman may not have, until recently, thought of his Tactics as relevant to the
 philosophy of science. It seems to me that he was amongst the last to know! To me
 Sidman was always a philosopher - literally a lover of knowledge. He has also
 been mentor-at-a-distance to countless numbers of us attempting to practice and
 improve our science. But I am heartened that Sidman has finally voiced his interest
 in philosophical matters and reminded our community of behavioral engineers that
 not all questions are empirical ones.
 147
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.64 on Fri, 22 Mar 2019 16:38:34 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Roche
 References
 Hayes, S. C., Barnes-Holmes, D., & Roche, B. (Eds.). (2001). Relational frame theory: A
 post-Skinnerian account of human language and cognition. New York: Plenum Press.
 Hull, D. L. (1984). Units of evolution: A metaphysical essay. In R. N. Brandon & R. M.
 Burian (Eds.), Genes, organisms , populations: Controversies over the units of
 selection (pp. 142-160). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
 Roche, B., & Barnes, D. (1997). The behavior of organisms? The Psychological Record '
 47 , 597-618.
 Sidman, M. (1979). Remarks. Behaviorism , 7, 123-126.
 Sidman, M. (1978). Remarks. Behaviorism , 6, 265-268.
 Sidman, M. (1977). Remarks. Behaviorism, 5, 111-113.
 Sidman, M. (1960). Tactics of scientific research: Evaluating experimental data in
 psychology. New York: Basic Books.
 Skinner, B. F. (1938). The behavior of organisms. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
 148
This content downloaded from 149.157.61.64 on Fri, 22 Mar 2019 16:38:34 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
